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This volume, like the others in the series, contains fertile discussion of key battlegrounds in contemporary metaethics. Space is short so I give brief, unequal, paper summaries, and some critical observations. Brevity maximizes apparent disagreement, so let me add at the outset that all the papers are cutting-edge work and testament to the high standards employed by the editor.

First up is Christine Korsgaard’s “The Relational Nature of the Good.” Korsgaard starts by pointing out the tangles that G. E. Moore got himself into discussing ‘my own good’ in *Principia Ethica*. Her view is presented thus: “It is not true that we need to know what is good before we know what is good-for someone, since despite its surface grammar, the notion of *good-for someone* is in fact the prior and more fundamental notion” (7). How should we interpret this (what kind of priority and fundamentality are in play? Is it an epistemic claim, a semantic claim, or something else?)? Korsgaard’s discussion is sometimes about “notions” (4), sometimes concepts (13), and sometimes “the good” (5). Korsgaard mostly uses concept talk and explicitly discusses concepts, so ascribing a conceptual thesis to her seems fair. This also makes sense of her describing an opposing view—that something can be good without being good for someone—as “unintelligible” (4). But this seems overambitious. Suppose one held that it would be better (in at least one respect) for well-being to be distributed equally, even if by leveling down (so no individual is made better off). Such a view is controversial, but can we not even make sense of it? Is it unintelligible? I think not. Indeed its making sense seems to explain the ease with which I am able to judge that it is false.

Another example Korsgaard mentions is the view that it is better that sentient life exists than that it not have existed. Given plausible assumptions, this is not true in virtue of existence rather than nonexistence being good for the existent (or the universe). But it is clearly intelligible that it is better that the universe contains sentient life than not.

Jonathan Way’s “Value and Reasons to Favour” provides support for the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value, the view that for something to be valuable is for it to be a fitting object of a proattitude. Rather than performing defensive maneuvers, Way assesses the credentials of alternate views that analyze reasons in terms of value. The key issue is whether such alternatives to FA analyses are (equally) capable of explaining this linking principle: if R is a consideration in which an outcome is good, then R is a reason to favor that outcome.
Way distinguishes object-based and attitude-based versions of this FA alternative. In basic forms, the *object* view takes reasons to favor an outcome to be respects in which that outcome is good, while the *attitude* view takes reasons to favor an outcome to be respects in which favoring that outcome would be good. Way shows that each is incapable of explaining the linking principle without incurring significant costs. The upshot is a strong indirect support for FA.

Another paper on reason generating is Kate Manne’s “On Being Social in Metaethics.” Her thesis is that some practical reasons are generated by social practices but only when such practices meet further conditions. Her view thereby contrasts with *subjectivist* views, which take an individual agent’s desires, choices, and so on, to be the source of reasons, and *objectivist* views, which simply take as basic that some facts are or provide reasons.

Manne distinguishes her general proposal from any particular development of the further condition, pointing out that the issue belongs in normative ethics. Nonetheless, she does provide a suggestion for the condition that social practices must meet in order to be reason generating. This is a ‘consequentialist’ constraint which is spelled out as the claim that the practice must be conducive to “human flourishing at large” (69), and it must meet the “constitutive aim or telos” of a social practice, namely, “helping people fare well rather than badly” (70), an aim which monstrous social practices violate, thus preventing them from being reason generating.

Understandably, these need unpacking before we can see which practices are disqualified, especially given Manne’s thin notion of what social practices are: “[they] involve multiple agents, who coordinate their actions with respect to one another, and who interact in the process [where such interactions] are structured and governed by social norms” (53). An initial worry is that the restrictions seem to definitely rule out too few of the social practices that do not plausibly generate reasons, for there is always the possibility that they are, incidentally, conducive to human flourishing at large or help people fare well rather than badly (taking account of all human lives and across the long term).

However, Manne tentatively supports the view that reason-generating social practices “must not be prone to bring serious suffering to anybody in the moral community” (71, my emphasis). She also suggests that a practice can be conducive to human flourishing even if it need not always actually lead to it and that the consequentialist constraint should not take a maximizing form (69 n. 48). This assuages the worry above but leads to a distinct worry, namely, that the constraint is too underspecified to currently assess. Nonetheless, the paper highlights a third alternative to subjectivist and objectivist views of reason generating.

Ruth Chang’s “Commitments, Reasons, and the Will” also defends a view of how some practical reasons arise. This time the star of the show is the *will*. A specific aim in this paper is an account of ‘internal commitment’, the sort of commitment one makes to a person in a relationship and which generates reasons to make sacrifices. Chang nicely explains how and why such commitments have been neglected, before examining, and dispatching, numerous proposals for what commitment consists in (evaluative belief, desire, endorsement, intentions, plans, policies). Her proposal is that commitment is a matter of willing and that in willing one exercises the normative power to create reasons for oneself. As Chang puts it, “Willing something to be a reason is the activity of placing your
will—your very agency—behind its being a reason” (93). A natural question is whether there is any more to be said about what willing is. There is one analogy offered, that of stipulating the meaning of a word, but more needs to be said. Chang suggests that willing can be reduced to natural properties (102), so it is tempting to think it is some complex of belief, desire, and intention, but her powerful case against all of the earlier proposals for what a commitment consists in would perhaps reapply.

Dale Dorsey examines “Two Dualisms of Practical Reason.” The standard way of presenting dualism is as follows: if morality requires that you A and prudence requires that you B, then neither A nor B is rationally unjustified. His first contribution is the point that dualism could be true in two ways. It could be a substantive principle, namely, that if you are in such a conflict situation then the all-things-considered upshot is that you may permissibly make either choice. An alternative reading of the principle is structural, claiming that the idea of an all-things-considered perspective or status, over and above the prudential and the moral, is incoherent.

By giving cases in which it is clear that an agent’s best interests are served by acting morally abhorrently, Dorsey convincingly shows that, absent heavy-duty jiggery-pokery, the substantive dualist position fails. His discussion of the structural form of dualism, engaging with David Copp’s work, is illuminating. The fulcrum is whether there is an account of the all-things-considered perspective which explains its authoritative position without doing so via some further higher-order perspective (and thereby generating a regress). Dorsey’s solution is to treat all normativity as being within the all-things-considered perspective, and thus denying that morality and prudence themselves generate normative requirements or reasons. This is a provocative suggestion, one that provokes worries of babies lost with bathwater, but merits further attention.

Jason Decker and Daniel Groll write with good news for those moral realists perturbed by the following argument from disagreement:

(P1) If in the face of disagreement about X, you have no more reason to believe that your opponent is in error than you are about X, then your belief about X does not amount to knowledge.

(P2) Many of most people’s moral beliefs are subject to disagreement where they have no more reason to think that their opponents are in error than they are.

(C) Many of most people’s moral beliefs are not knowledge. (140)

Focusing on Sarah McGrath’s recent work, Decker and Groll argue that no plausible interpretation of the no more reason condition makes both premises true. Extreme versions of the condition (e.g., any reasonable people disagree with you) make P1 implausible by entailing that no one knows that humans evolved (given the existence of mistaken but reasonable people who believe that they were created). More moderate versions (e.g., substantial numbers of reasonable people...
disagree with you, and there is [i] no consensus among experts for your belief, and [ii] your opponents have not based their belief on a fallacious argument) seem more promising. But as Decker and Groll show, although this condition makes ‘no more reason’ plausible in P2, it overgeneralizes and precludes knowledge that humans evolved. This is because there is no way of identifying experts about human origin in a way consistent with P1 with a moderate version of ‘no more reason’. Thus, if one uses this moderate version of ‘no more reason’ to argue that we have no moral knowledge in the face of disagreement, one must accept that we have no knowledge about the origin of humans, a price too steep to pay.

An especially nice feature of the paper is their discussion of conciliatory approaches to peer disagreement and the plausible case they make that there are times when one can rationally disagree even with consensus of actual experts (whom one acknowledges as such). Anyone interested in peer disagreement will gain from their discussion, especially the careful discussion and differentiation of self-undermining and self-defeating principles.

Jussi Suikkanen’s “Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem” admonishes error theorists (Suikkanen cites Garner, Mackie, Olson, and Pigden) who have been relaxed about combining error theory with continued engagement in first-order moral discourse. Suikkanen distinguishes five possible views on what will and should happen to agents’ first-order moral beliefs when they believe error theory. Two views, which Suikkanen sets aside, claim that believing error theory to be true would lead to people abandoning their first-order views.

The remaining three claim that agents could retain their first-order moral views, even in the face of believing error theory (the views differing on what agents should then do: keep them for prudential reasons, ditch them prudential reasons, or replace them with fictionalist make-believe attitudes for prudential reasons). The rub, Suikkanen argues, is that these treat moral judgments as systematically insensitive to evidence which, according to most plausible theories of the nature of belief, means that they are not beliefs. Thus, this continued relaxed moralizing undercuts the cognitivist plank of error theory.

Two points which, understandably, are not taken up: First, the prudential reasons appealed to by relaxed error theorists must be immune from the arguments used to establish moral error theory. Second, it is odd for relaxed error theorists to present general claims about the prudential case for a person to continue to engage in first order moral discourse on believing error theory. This is presumably highly variable. After all, one can imagine an agent’s whose psychology makes it such that they would be better off abandoning moral discourse (suppose they are prone to debilitating guilt or making imprudent efforts to aid others in light of their judgments).

Alex Silk’s “Truth Conditions and the Meaning of Ethical Terms” defends the idea that we should do the descriptive semantics of normative terms in a way that builds in no substantive conclusions. He does this by showing how a form of ‘condition semantics’ is superior to both Moral Invariantism—(roughly) the view that moral terms are interpreted with respect to the correct moral standard—and Moral Contextualism: the view that moral terms are interpreted with respect to a moral standard supplied by context. The familiar problem with Moral Invariantism is that it seems to lose the ability to say that those who are in the wrong
about morality are nevertheless competent with moral terms. Silk’s objection to contextualism is that it makes ethical belief a state of mind about what the relevant standards permit/require, which seems both incorrect in general and also, implausibly, to make it impossible to have a normative standard without being able to have beliefs about what that standard requires. Doubtless there are contextualist countermoves and the condition semantics proposal (entirely reasonably) needs further development, but the paper plausibly provides a neutral semantic framework which leaves the main lines of metaethical division intact.

Terence Cuneo’s contribution is a forensic examination of the attempt to combine expressivism with deflationism about moral facts and properties. Cuneo’s paper is testament to the way metaethics draws from other parts of the discipline, and it provides extremely careful examination of the deflationary project. Space constraints make summary of the argument imprudent, but the key difficulty Cuneo presents to the expressivist is that of being consistently deflationist about the property wrongness, presenting a plausible, nonsubjectivist, account of the corresponding concept, while accounting for the fact that normative ethical theories plausibly tell us about the nature of wrongness.

The final two contributions, by Temmu Toppinen and Mark Schroeder, are ambitious attempts to defend a new and distinctive variety of expressivism. The conceptual framework used by Schroeder is very useful for understanding both. Schroeder draws a useful pair of distinctions thus:

- **Unrestrained expressivism:** there are no restrictions on what state of mind a sentence can express.

- **Restrained expressivism:** there are restrictions on what state of mind a sentence can express (which is compatible with different sentences expressing different mental state types).

- **Tempered expressivism:** in order to be expressible by a declarative sentence a mental state must ‘involve’ ordinary descriptive belief in some way.

- **Untempered expressivism:** ordinary descriptive belief has no such privileged role. (283–85)

Tempered expressivism is a special case of restrained expressivism. One form of tempered expressivism is familiar from hybrid expressivism, where hybrid expressivism combines:

1. Moral judgments have belief and desire-like components (and the truth of the belief component is insufficient for the truth of the moral judgment).
2. Moral sentences express belief and desire-like states.

Schroeder and Toppinen each develop another form of tempered expressivism. This “higher-order” (Toppinen) or “relational” (Schroeder) expressivism is the
view that moral sentences express a relation between one’s ordinary descriptive beliefs and one’s desire-like states (e.g., states of approval or disapproval). For example, to judge that torture is wrong is for one’s beliefs about torture and one’s desires to be suitably related.

To understand such relational expressivist judgments, Schroeder (290) provides a useful analogy with plans. Suppose we have conditional plans—plans to $\Phi$ in circumstances $C$—and beliefs about the circumstances that we are in. We can then make sense of unconditional plans by taking them to simply consist of the relational state of planning to $\Phi$ in $C$ and believing that one is in $C$.

Toppinen and Schroeder show that relational views are (at least) equally as successful as hybrid expressivist views at handling the Frege-Geach problem and Dorr’s wishful-thinking objection. One merit of relational expressivism worth highlighting is its greater flexibility over hybrid expressivism in a way that helps with accommodating disagreement.

Arthur and Martha both believe giving to charity is required. Suppose that this is because they are in the following states:

Arthur: Desire to perform actions insofar as they promote happiness and belief that giving to charity promotes happiness.

Martha: Desire to perform actions insofar as they promote autonomy and belief that giving to charity promotes autonomy.

Switch now to a case of disagreement. Arthur thinks euthanasia is wrong. Martha thinks it permissible. Suppose their states of mind are thus:

Arthur: Desire to perform actions insofar as they promote happiness and belief that euthanasia promotes happiness.

Martha: Desire to perform actions insofar as they promote autonomy and belief that euthanasia does not promote autonomy.

Problem: if, with hybrid expressivism, we take the moral judgments to be the combinations of desire and belief, we do not explain disagreement, as their respective states of mind do not straightforwardly conflict. A plausible necessary condition for disagreement is that the relevant mental states would, if held by one person, be a form of incoherence. But someone could have all of the beliefs and desires Martha and Arthur have without incoherence. There is thus a prima facie worry that hybrid expressivist views have a problem accounting for disagreement.

What is important on the relational expressivist view is not the particular beliefs and desires the agent has but their relation. Arthur believes that euthanasia is permissible in virtue of the relation between his belief state and his desire state. And conversely, Martha has the belief that euthanasia is impermissible because of the relation between her belief state and desire state. As Toppinen (276) puts it, what is essential is not the particular beliefs and desires that they
have but, rather, “how their desires and beliefs are related to each other.” There is much more to be said (and much has been said) on this issue, so my point here is only that relational expressivists avoid this disagreement problem from the outset.

There are thus two, related, pro tanto advantages for the relational expressivist view visible here. First, due to a focus on the relation (and not the relata), the relational expressivist can be inclusive about the states of mind that realize moral judgments; there need be no particular belief state shared by everyone who holds some moral view, a feature which dovetails with the antirealist spirit of hybrid expressivism (as Schroeder points out, it is contrary to the spirit of the hybrid expressivist view to require that each person have some particular descriptive belief in order to believe, e.g., that tax avoidance is wrong, and hybrid expressivists have allowed the descriptive belief to vary between thinkers). Second, despite this inclusivity about the states of mind that realize moral judgments, the relational expressivist avoids difficulties in explaining disagreement.

The good-making features of this volume and the reasons to read it have been spelled out above. There is no better way to get an up-to-date impression of a wide variety of the debates in contemporary metaethics.

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The first volume of the Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility collects twelve excellent papers presented at the inaugural New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility held in 2011 by established and emerging figures in the philosophy of action and moral responsibility (n.b.: Gary Watson’s keynote is not included in this collection). David Shoemaker’s clear and useful introduction is an indispensable guide to this rich volume. Though each contribution deserves careful consideration, that task is beyond the scope of this review. Instead, I take this as an opportunity to reflect on some broader theoretical considerations that arise when we consider how work in the philosophy of action can contribute to our understanding of moral responsibility and vice versa. One question this collection provokes concerns how a philosophy of agency should be evaluated. Should it aim to give us an account of nonalienated agency? Or, should it serve as a useful theoretical tool for a breadth of related issues, in particular, concerning moral responsibility? I am not presuming that a theory cannot meet both of these desiderata. However, some of the work on moral responsibility in this volume suggests that moral responsibility requires an account of agency that falls short of what philosophers of action often take to be the gold standard—nonalienated agency.

Sarah Buss’s paper, “The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation,” takes Harry Frankfurt’s idea that one could be a “passive bystander” to one’s motives as the basis for a wide-ranging critique of two central strategies in the philosophy of agency: those that understand rational